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Abstract
Competition models typically assume that consumers who cannot compare prices,
buy randomly. This paper models the idea that firms may obfuscate product infor-
mation to confuse consumers, but confused consumers prefer simple alternatives.
We show that complexity aversion generates competition in obfuscation, in addition
to prices. Markets become more transparent, which enables more consumers to
understand prices and stimulates price competition. Three results are most interest-
ing. Firstly, even when simple products are the most expensive in the market, firm
profit can be lower when confused consumers favour simple products. Secondly,
profit is not always lower in less obfuscated markets. Thirdly, obfuscation can only
be eliminated if some consumers are always confused and policies to improve con-
sumer sophistication can stimulate obfuscation.
JEL classifications: L11, L13, D18, C72, D43.
1. Introduction
The framing of product information strongly influences consumers’ choices. In particular,
retailers often complicate their product information to confuse consumers and soften price
competition, referred to as strategic obfuscation.1 Whilst the incentives for firms to obfus-
cate have been extensively explored for many variations in the supply side of the market,
surprisingly little attention has been given to how consumers respond to obfuscation.
Theoretical models typically assume that some consumers buy at the lowest price, whilst
others (who cannot understand prices) choose randomly. When sellers compete only in
prices, this random purchase rule is justified because products are homogeneous and con-
sumers have no preferences over sellers. However, when sellers also choose their obfusca-
tion, the rule requires that consumers are indifferent between complex and simple
alternatives, which is contradicted by evidence. Instead, buyers exhibit complexity aversion
and discriminate against obfuscating sellers.
1 See Grubb, (2015) and Spiegler (2016) for recent surveys, and K}oszegi (2014) for a review of exploit-
ative contracts.
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Huck and Weizsa¨cker (1999), Mador et al. (2000), and Sonsino et al. (2002) gave initial
traction to the existence of complexity aversion in experimental appraisals of expected util-
ity theory. Participants bid lower prices for, or choose to avoid, more complicated lotteries
irrespective of risk. Using survey data, Spenner and Freeman (2012) find that consumers
are more likely to choose simple products, which are easier to evaluate and simplify
decision-making. Homburg et al. (2014) document complexity aversion in a retail market
experiment. Buyers are less likely to purchase complex promotions, which individuals asso-
ciate with higher prices, lower price fairness and lower transparency. Iyengar and
Kamenica (2010) show that individuals are biased towards less complex investments and
De los Santos et al. (2012) find that the ease with which consumers can navigate around
prices online affects choices. Huck and Wallace (2015) show that price framing influences
decision-making significantly and Lesgards et al. (2015) show that individuals choose sim-
ple linear tariffs instead of more complicated but advantageous non-linear tariffs.
How does complexity aversion affect firms’ obfuscation and pricing incentives? Does
complexity aversion harm firms, consumers or both? When are consumer protection poli-
cies effective? Our objective in this paper is to address these important open questions. Our
enquiry is motivated by two observations. Firstly, the increased regulatory concern that ob-
fuscation induces imperfect and persistently low levels of consumer switching, which causes
otherwise competitive markets to fail (Wilson and Waddams Price, 2010; CMA, 2015a,
2015b). Secondly, the growth in simplicity-orientated marketing (Siegel and Gale, 2017).
For example, some UK supermarkets have voluntarily simplified their pricing by remov-
ing jargon and replacing multi-buy offers with simple regular prices (Thomas, 2016).2
Online estate agents champion simple flat fees (Hammond, 2018), NPower energy claim
‘we’re making our tariffs simpler,’3 Santander bank advertises ‘savings made simple,’4 and
Ryanair advertises ‘low fares, made simple’ (Faull, 2015). Furthermore, firms with simple
branding outperform their competitors (Siegel and Gale, 2017), which suggests that the
existing literature overstates firms’ incentives to obfuscate. We find this to be true and pro-
vide a new explanation for firms to voluntarily reduce obfuscation. We also identify market
characteristics that make such behaviour more likely, with strong regulatory implications.
We develop a duopoly framework in which sellers independently select a price and an
obfuscation level. Aggregate obfuscation in the market determines the fraction of consum-
ers that understand prices. Informed consumers, who understand prices, buy from the
cheapest seller. Uninformed consumers, who cannot understand prices, are divided into
two types. Some uninformed consumers purchase from the firm with the lowest obfusca-
tion, whilst the remainder buy randomly. This division follows an exogenous proportional
rule that we interpret as the degree of complexity aversion. This specification enriches the
standard random purchasing rule, which is a special case when we set complexity aversion
to zero.
Two types of obfuscation are considered. In the first model, prices and obfuscation are
simultaneously adjustable for sellers. For instance, retailers naturally choose the quantity of
dimensions of a pricing scheme when selecting prices, and comparing products with more
dimensions is more challenging for consumers (Iyengar and Kamenica, 2010). In the second
model, firms choose their obfuscation level before selecting their price to reflect types of
2 www.about.sainsburys.co.uk/news/latest-news/2016/11-02-2016. Accessed 23/04/2018.
3 www.npower.com/Campaigns/marketing-comms/home/index.htm. Accessed 24/04/2018.
4 In-store promotional materials. Accessed 31/03/2016.
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obfuscation that cannot be adjusted as quickly as prices. Obfuscation in this model could
include the complexity of a website or in-store promotional materials.
We show that introducing complexity aversion generates novel dimensions of competi-
tion. Sellers now compete to offer the simplest alternative, in addition to the lowest price,
which leads to lower obfuscation in the market. This enables more consumers to act as
informed buyers, which stimulates price competition. For a class of parameter values for
consumer sophistication,5 obfuscation can be eliminated by market forces. This benefits all
buyers. However, when obfuscation is not fully eradicated, new distributional concerns can
arise. For instance, when firms commit to obfuscation before prices, consumers who buy
the simplest product pay the highest price in the market. However, their complexity aver-
sion generates lower prices for other types of consumers.
Following the literature review, Section 2 outlines the main model and evaluates the ra-
tionality of complexity aversion (Section 2.2.3). We consider the simultaneous game first
because this timing structure illustrates the effects of complexity aversion most simply and
acts as a point of comparison with the sequential model. In Section 3 we discuss the main
results and policy implications. Section 4 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
This article bridges the economic psychology literature on complexity aversion with the
strategic obfuscation and bounded rationality literatures in Industrial Organization, where
it is well-established that firms may find obfuscation profitable (Ellison, 2005; Gabaix and
Laibson, 2006; Spiegler, 2006; Carlin, 2009; Grubb, 2015; Heidhues et al., 2017).6 Two
main theoretical approaches for consumer behaviour have been proposed. Firstly, a
clearing-house structure: Conditional on firms’ obfuscation efforts, some consumers are
confused and cannot understand any prices, whilst others understand everything
(Carlin, 2009; Piccione and Spiegler, 2012). The proportion of confused buyers, who typic-
ally buy randomly, increases with obfuscation. Secondly, search-theoretic models in which
consumers engage in costly search. Obfuscation directs the order of search and increases
the cost per search, reducing aggregate search (Wilson, 2010; Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012).
Our model sits between these two approaches. The structure is rooted in a clearing-house
set-up as consumers understand all or none of the prices. However, complexity averse con-
sumers are attracted to the lowest obfuscation seller, which connects to directed search.
The closest related work is the analysis of framing effects (Salant and Rubinstein, 2008).
Piccione and Spiegler (2012) allow firms to choose a price and a frame. Buyers are initially
assigned to a random default seller and the probability that consumers can compare prices
decreases when firms use different frames, which generates switching inertia.
Spiegler (2014) generalizes their framework to study the analytical properties of consumer
choice functions. Gaudeul and Sugden (2012) also consider consumers who cannot com-
pare prices in different frames. They study the heuristic that uninformed consumers buy
from the cheapest firm that uses the most common frame, which restricts the use of individ-
uated framing unless firms can cooperate (Crosetto and Gaudeul, 2017).
Our paper develops in the opposite direction; some frames are intrinsically more com-
plex to understand even if sellers choose the same frame. Furthermore, our buyers do not
5 More specifically, for a class of values for the fraction of informed consumers for each level of
aggregate obfuscation by sellers.
6 See Spiegler (2011) for a textbook treatment of Bounded Rationality in Industrial Economics.
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simplify their decision process ex ante.7 Instead, confused consumers prefer firms that
obfuscate less. Therefore, the counter-obfuscation forces we study operate at the firm level as
firms compete for complexity averse consumers. Gaudeul and Sugden’s (2012) operates at
the market level, as firms coordinate to a common format. The two approaches provide com-
plementary but distinct explanations for market forces to restrict obfuscation.
Whilst very different in focus, our paper is closely related to Chioveanu and
Zhou (2013) who comprehensively analyse the effects of two sources of consumer confu-
sion: individuated framing and complex framing. They study the effect of greater competi-
tion on framing choices and show how competition can harm consumers. Notably, their
equilibria are robust to a consumer bias towards simple framing but they do not explore
this. Our work complements Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) by fixing complex framing as the
main source of consumer confusion and analysing the important competitive, welfare and
policy implications of complexity aversion. In Section 2.1 we state how our model nests
part of their framework and position the model precisely within the literature.
Other reasons proposed within the literature for firms to reduce obfuscation stem from
asymmetries in production technologies (Dahremo¨ller, 2013; Wenzel, 2014) and (exogen-
ous) market prominence (Gu and Wenzel, 2014, 2015). In our framework, firm asymme-
tries are not needed.
2. The model
Consider a perfect information game of competition between two identical firms who sell a
homogeneous product to a unit mass of buyers. Each buyer will purchase one unit of the
product at any price not exceeding their reservation threshold, normalized to 1. Production
costs are symmetric and normalized to zero, with no capacity constraints. Firms independ-
ently select a price and an obfuscation level (k), where we follow the literature by limiting
obfuscation to High (H) or Low (L). The combination of firms’ obfuscation efforts deter-
mines market complexity.
For each level of market complexity, each consumer is informed or uninformed. Let
/ðki; kjÞ denote the function that specifies the fraction of informed consumers, for each combin-
ation of obfuscation choices. Define /ðL;LÞ ¼ lL; /ðL;HÞ ¼ /ðH;LÞ ¼ lM; /ðH;HÞ ¼ lH
as the fraction of informed buyers. Informed consumers buy from the lowest priced seller.
Uninformed consumers cannot compare prices. Therefore, a fraction of uninformed consumers,
d 2 ½0;1, buy from the firm with the lowest obfuscation, with equal sharing at ties. The remain-
ing ð1  dÞ uninformed consumers buy randomly. d is exogenous and captures the degree of
complexity aversion amongst consumers. We assume that when obfuscation increases fewer
consumers are informed:
Assumption 1 0  lH < lM < lL  1.8
Obfuscation plays two roles. Firstly, each firm’s obfuscation contributes to market com-
plexity, which determines the fraction of informed consumers. This is the standard role
7 Papi (2015) and Bachi and Spiegler (2018) also present models in which consumers simplify their
decision process ex ante due to tradeoff avoidance.
8 This assumption has strong support in the literature. See Kalayci and Potters (2011), Kalayci (2015)
and Huck and Wallace (2015) for experimental evidence and Wilson and Waddams Price (2010) for
empirical evidence.
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within the literature. Secondly, the relative obfuscation of each firm determines the alloca-
tion of uninformed buyers.
In our first model (Section 2.1), firms select obfuscation and prices simultaneously. In
our second model (Section 2.2), firms select obfuscation before competing in prices.
Distinguishing between these cases has both technical and economic significance. From a
technical perspective, the sequential game allows firms to condition prices on the obfusca-
tion decisions of all sellers. In the simultaneous model, firms set prices based on expecta-
tions of their rival’s obfuscation. From an economic perspective, the frameworks capture
different types of obfuscation.
Before solving the model, several remarks regarding the literature are helpful. Firstly, if
we ignore obfuscation and all consumers are informed, we restore Bertrand competition.
Secondly, if we ignore obfuscation but allow some consumers to be uninformed, the model
collapses to Varian (1980) price competition. Thirdly, if we change the source of consumer
confusion such that 1 ¼ lL ¼ lH > lM, the simultaneous model fits with Piccione and
Spiegler (2012) and Gaudeul and Sugden (2012). Gaudeul and Sugden (2012) study aver-
sion to individuated framing when n (number of firms)  3. In contrast, we consider confu-
sion from complex framing ðlL > lM > lHÞ, allow lL  1 and introduce complexity
aversion: d > 0, with n¼2.
Fourthly, ignoring complexity aversion: d ¼ 0, and imposing lL ¼ 1, captures
Chioveanu and Zhou’s (2013, Proposition 2) duopoly when lM > lH. They also allow lH >
lM and n  3, consistent with their focus on framing as competition increases. Notably, their
main results are robust to a bias towards simple framing but they do not study the implica-
tions.9 In contrast, we fix the source of consumer confusion: lL > lM > lH, allow: lL  1,
and focus on the important effects of complexity aversion: d > 0. The restricted case:
d ¼ 0; lL ¼ 1, acts as our benchmark for analysis to illustrate the importance of these restric-
tions for generating previous results. Fifthly, if firms vary in obfuscation in the sequential
model, they choose prices with uneven shares of uninformed buyers, which captures
Narasimhan (1988). Pricing in the sequential model also relates to Gu and Wenzel (2014)
when d ¼ 0, except they assume one exogenously appointed ‘prominent’ seller receives a
larger share of uninformed consumers independently of price and obfuscation. Our firms are
ex ante identical but the lower obfuscation firm becomes ‘prominent’ endogenously in the
sense that they receive a larger share of uninformed consumers when d > 0.
2.1 Simultaneous obfuscation and pricing
The simultaneous game unfolds over two stages. In period 1, firms choose prices and obfus-
cation. In period 2, consumers purchase according to their type. Equilibrium depends on
the degree of complexity aversion ðdÞ exhibited by uninformed buyers. Define dc  lLlM1lM .
We begin with the case where the degree of complexity aversion is small: d < dc, before
considering the case with stronger complexity aversion: d  dc, and exploring the import-
ance of this critical threshold.
Proposition 1 For d < dc firms follow mixed strategies in prices and obfuscation:
kk; F
kðpÞ

. kL ¼ lMlHþddlMlLlH defines the probability firms select low obfuscation. When
9 Let nL and nH denote the number of firms that use frames L and H, respectively, who jointly offer
the lowest price for each frame. Consumers choose a frame L firm with probability: UðnL ;nH ÞnL , and a
frame H firm with probability: ½1UðnL ;nH ÞnH , where UðnL; nHÞ 
nL
nLþnH .
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low obfuscation is selected, a price p0 is drawn randomly from a distribution FLðp0Þ.
When high obfuscation is selected, a price p is drawn randomly from a distribution FHðpÞ.
The price distributions have adjacent supports such that SuppFLðp0Þ ¼ ½pl;pm; Supp
FHðpÞ ¼ ½pm;1.
In equilibrium, sellers randomize their price and obfuscation. The intuition follows that sellers
prefer to choose high obfuscation to soften price competition. However, if both firms choose
high obfuscation, a seller prefers to deviate to low obfuscation and undercut the rival’s price
(Chioveanu and Zhou, 2013). This increases the amount of informed buyers, which the firm
subsequently attracts, and increases the firm’s share of uninformed buyers due to complexity
aversion. These competing incentives induce sellers to randomize their obfuscation. The presence
of informed and uninformed consumers also induces firms to randomize their price to prevent
their competitor from undercutting and stealing the informed consumers (Varian, 1980).
2.1.1 Equilibrium payoffs and pricing Let the expected payoff to firm i, given their price-
obfuscation combination (ki, pi), be written piðki;piÞ.
Lemma 1 For d < dc, the price-obfuscation combination ðH; 1Þ belongs to the equilibrium
mixed strategy.
All proofs are given in the Appendix. A seller charging the maximum price only attracts un-
informed consumers, which fixes the highest equilibrium price at the reservation price.
A less competitively priced seller benefits most from confusing consumers. That is,
piðH; 1Þ  piðL;1Þ for any d 2 ½0; dc, where:
piðH;1Þ ¼ 1
2
 ½kL  ð1  dÞð1  lMÞ þ kH  ð1  lHÞ (1)
If the rival also chooses high obfuscation, complexity averse consumers and random pur-
chasers are shared equally. If seller i reduces his price to p<1, he also attracts informed
consumers with probability ½1  FHðpÞ. If the rival chooses low obfuscation, only random
purchasers buy from the high obfuscation seller. Equilibrium requires that a high obfusca-
tion firm is indifferent between charging 1 and any other price p in the support of FHðpÞ:
kLð1  dÞð1  lMÞ þ kHð1  lHÞ ¼ kL  ð1  dÞð1  lMÞ þ kH

1 þ lH½1  2FHðpÞ
 
p
(2)
Equally, the firm must be indifferent between ðH; 1Þ and ðL; p0Þ, where p0 is any price in the
support of FLðp0Þ:
kLð1  dÞð1  lMÞ þ kHð1  lHÞ ¼ kL

1 þ lL½1  2FLðp0Þ

þ kHð1 þ dþ lM  dlMÞ
 
p0
(3)
When both firms choose low obfuscation, complexity averse consumers and random pur-
chasers are shared equally. Firms compete in prices for informed buyers. When the rival
selects high obfuscation, the low obfuscation firm secures all complexity averse consumers,
all informed consumers and half of the random purchasers. Solving (3) yields explicit solu-
tions for pl and pm where FHðpmÞ ¼ 0; FLðpmÞ ¼ 1 and FLðplÞ ¼ 0.
The price distributions must have adjacent supports. The reason that the supports can-
not be disjoint is similar to Varian’s (1980) explanation for the absence of a gap within the
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support of a single price distribution: Profit would increase by deviating upwards to a price
in the gap. More precisely, a seller would earn higher profit by choosing low obfuscation
and increasing their price from the upper bound of FLðp0Þ until the lower bound of FHðpÞ,
which yields the same demand but at a higher price. We show below that an intersection
with several prices cannot exist because a firm with a higher price requires that more con-
sumers are confused.
2.1.2 Equilibrium obfuscation We can now derive the optimal obfuscation strategy and
demonstrate that a firm will never choose a price from the support of the distribution asso-
ciated with the other level of obfuscation. This translates into: piðH;pÞ  piðL; pÞ and
piðL; p0Þ  piðH;p0Þ. A sketch of the proof (contained in the Appendix) is as follows. From
the adjacency of the price supports, the firm is indifferent between low and high obfusca-
tion at the boundary price: pm. Therefore, at pm the two conditions above for optimal ob-
fuscation hold with equality. Solving either condition yields a closed form expression for
the probability of low obfuscation: kL ¼ lMlHþdð1lMÞlLlH , which can be used to confirm the
equilibrium obfuscation-price strategy. We now characterize the optimal strategy when
d  dc.
Proposition 2 For d  dc firms choose low obfuscation. Prices are drawn from the distri-
bution: FLðp0Þ ¼ 1  1lL2lL
1p0
p0
h i
with support: 1lL1þlL ;1
h i
.
Proposition 2 restores Varian’s (1980) classic model of sales as a special case when
kL ¼ 1. For generality, define: kL ¼ Min lMlHþdð1lMÞlLlH ; 1
n o
.
2.1.3 Profit, welfare and analysis We now examine the effects of complexity aversion on
competition and welfare. Policy implications are considered separately in Section 3.1.
Expected profit can be written:
pi ¼ 1
2
 1  lH 
½lM  lH þ dð1  lMÞ2
lL  lH
" #
(4)
Proposition 3 When prices and obfuscation are simultaneous, the effects of complexity
aversion are:
i. For d < dc, higher complexity aversion ðdÞ increases the probability of low obfuscation,
reduces the lower bound of the lowest price distribution and increases price dispersion.
Average prices and firm profit decrease.
ii. For d  dc, an increase in complexity aversion has no impact on pricing, profit or
obfuscation.
In the benchmark case ðd ¼ 0; lL ¼ 1Þ, firms randomize their price and obfuscation. When
we allow some consumers to always be confused ðd ¼ 0; lL < 1Þ, the probability of low
obfuscation increases and profit decreases. Firms are more willing to choose low obfusca-
tion because more consumers are always confused.
Introducing complexity aversion ðd > 0; lL ¼ 1Þ increases the probability of low obfus-
cation because the cost of high obfuscation, in terms of the expected reduction in demand,
increases. This creates more informed buyers, which incentivizes firms to make deeper price
cuts and reduces profit. Importantly, a low obfuscation equilibrium ðkL ¼ 1Þ cannot exist
when lL ¼ 1 if some uninformed consumers buy randomly ðd < 1Þ. The intuition is if both
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firms choose low obfuscation, Bertrand competition drives profit to zero.10 By deviating to
high obfuscation, a firm generates uninformed consumers and earns positive profit from his
share of the random purchasers. In the extreme case where no uninformed consumers buy
randomly ðd ¼ 1Þ, a firm that deviates to high obfuscation receives zero demand.
Therefore, equilibrium profit is zero and sellers become indifferent between low obfusca-
tion and deviating to high obfuscation.
In the general case: lL < 1; d > 0, increasing complexity aversion ðdÞ increases the prob-
ability of low obfuscation and reduces profit at a faster rate than when lL ¼ 1. Firms are less
reluctant to choose low obfuscation because more consumers are already confused and the
marginal benefit from one firm using high obfuscation (lL  lM) is smaller. Therefore, com-
plexity aversion has stronger effects in markets where more consumers are always unin-
formed. A low obfuscation equilibrium is also possible and exists whenever d  dc.
Remark 1 In the simultaneous game with d < 1, high obfuscation can only be eliminated
by complexity aversion if some consumers are always confused: lL < 1.
The intuition is when lL < 1, firms earn positive profit in a low obfuscation equilibrium
due to the presence of uninformed buyers and this payoff can exceed the (positive) payoff
from deviating to high obfuscation. As discussed above, this cannot occur when lL ¼ 1 be-
cause profit in a low obfuscation equilibrium is zero and deviating to high obfuscation gen-
erates strictly positive profit. The interpretation for d ¼ dc is clearer when rewritten as:
dð1  lMÞ ¼ lL  lM. The LHS corresponds to the value of complexity averse consumers
and the R.H.S. corresponds to the marginal effect of obfuscation. When the benefit from
high obfuscation is equal to the cost (in terms of the foregone demand), high obfuscation is
not profitable. This result is important because market forces can eliminate obfuscation
and existing studies that neglect complexity aversion systematically overestimate obfusca-
tion incentives.
The pro-competitive effect of complexity aversion is intuitive from the pricing analysis
but the precise forces require explanation. Firstly, complexity aversion has a direct effect on
profit because these consumers inadvertently buy at the lowest price, which erodes profit.
Secondly, complexity aversion generates a positive market externality by incentivizing firms
to reduce their obfuscation, which allows more consumers to understand prices and erodes
profit further. We decompose the Direct and Externality effects in more detail later.
Example 1 Let lL ¼ 0:75; lM ¼ 0:5;lH ¼ 0:25. Figure 1 demonstrates the probability that
each firm chooses low obfuscation. dc ¼ 0:5. Figures 2 and 3 indicate the price distributions for
d ¼ 0:25 and d ¼ 0:4, respectively. The solid (dashed) curve indicates the price distribution for
a low (high) obfuscation seller. When complexity aversion is larger (Fig. 3), the probability of
low obfuscation is higher and price competition is stronger. pm increases because high obfusca-
tion firms require higher prices to compensate for the loss of complexity averse buyers.
2.2 Sequential obfuscation and pricing
In the simultaneous environment, firms that obfuscate less charge lower prices. Therefore,
consumers who buy from the least obfuscating firm buy at the lowest price and profit
decreases with complexity aversion. One might suspect that in an alternative model, where
the least obfuscated products are most expensive, the pro-competitive effects of complexity
10 See Vives (2001), Ch. 5 for a textbook treatment of the Bertrand framework.
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aversion would disappear. We now show that, surprisingly, this reasoning often fails. In
period 1, firms select their obfuscation level. In period 2, obfuscation decisions become
common knowledge and firms choose prices. In period 3, consumers buy as before. We
solve the game using backward induction. The following definition aids the discussion.
Fig. 1. Probability assigned to low obfuscation.
Fig. 2. Price distributions ðd ¼ 0:25Þ.
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Definition 1 Captive Consumers: The captive consumers for a firm correspond to the pro-
portion of buyers that are guaranteed to buy from that firm at any price not exceeding their
reservation threshold, once obfuscation decisions have been committed.
When firms select the same obfuscation level, captives are distributed equally. This produ-
ces a Varian (1980) style price equilibrium (Section 2.2.1). When firms differ in obfusca-
tion, one seller has more captives when setting prices. This produces a Narasimhan (1988)
style price equilibrium (Section 2.2.2).
2.2.1 Symmetric pricing Consider first the case where both firms select low obfuscation.
Lemma 2 establishes several well-known results.
Lemma 2 There exists no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices. For any /ðki; kjÞ 2
ð0; 1Þ all firms earn positive profit and compete in price distributions bounded from above
by 1. If both sellers choose high obfuscation, the lower bound on prices is higher and prices
are less dispersed than if both sellers choose low obfuscation.
A pure strategy equilibrium cannot exist due to standard undercutting incentives and the
presence of uninformed consumers guarantees positive profit (Varian, 1980). At the reser-
vation price, the firm is definitely more expensive than the rival and the payoff can be writ-
ten: piðpi;pjjki ¼ kj ¼ L;pi ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1lL2 : Each firm must be indifferent across all prices in
the support of the price distribution, GLðpÞ, such that:
1  lL
2
¼ 1  lL
2
þ lL½1 GLðpÞ
 
p (5)
Firms trade-off charging a higher price to exploit captive demand with charging a lower price to
increase the probability of attracting informed consumers. In equilibrium these tensions balance
and the minimum price is: p
L
¼ ð1lLÞ1þlL . Solving (5) yields: G
LðpÞ ¼ 1  1lL2lL
1p
p
h i
. By symmetry,
Fig. 3. Price distributions ðd ¼ 0:4Þ.
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when both firms select high obfuscation, prices are drawn according to: GHðpÞ ¼ 1  1lH2lH
1p
p
h i
with support ð1lHÞ1þlH ; 1
h i
. Price competition is weaker when fewer consumers are informed.
Therefore, average prices are higher and price dispersion is lower under high obfuscation. This
illustrates the collective incentive for firms to obfuscate.
2.2.2 Asymmetric pricing Consider now the pricing strategy when firms adopt different ob-
fuscation levels. Captive consumers are unequally distributed, which produces a mass point
in the distribution for the low obfuscation firm at the reservation price (Narasimhan, 1988).
The high obfuscation rival chooses prices strictly below the reservation price. Fix the profit of
the low obfuscation firm, firm i, at the reservation price. The firm attracts only captive con-
sumers, which yields a payoff: piðpi; pjjki < kjÞ ¼ ð1þdÞð1lMÞ2 : The mixed strategy equilibrium
makes the firm indifferent between any price in the support:
ð1 þ dÞð1  lMÞ
2
¼ ð1 þ dÞð1  lMÞ
2
þ lM½1 GjðpÞ
 
p (6)
Solving for GjðpÞ yields the probability distribution over prices for the high obfuscation
firm, defined over ð1þdÞð1lMÞ1þdþlMð1dÞ ;1
h 
. To compute the price distribution for the low obfusca-
tion firm, write a similar indifference condition for the rival at the minimum price, noting
that the reservation price is not strictly contained in its support. At the lower bound, the
firm is guaranteed all informed consumers and half of the random purchasers:
ð1  dÞð1  lMÞ
2
þ lM
 
 ð1 þ dÞð1  lMÞ
1 þ dþ lMð1  dÞ
¼ ð1  dÞð1  lMÞ
2
þ lM½1 GiðpÞ
 
p
Solving for GiðpÞ yields the optimal price distribution for the low obfuscation firm, defined
over a near-identical support: ð1þdÞð1lMÞ1þdþlMð1dÞ ;1
h i
, with a mass point at 1 of: 2dð1lMÞ1þdþlMð1dÞ. It can
be demonstrated that the price distribution of the low obfuscation firm is higher in terms of
first-order stochastic dominance (see Narasimhan, 1988). The low obfuscation seller is less
willing to compete for informed consumers because of his monopoly power over complex-
ity averse consumers.
Remark 2 In the sequential model, the lowest obfuscation firm has the highest (average)
price. In the simultaneous model, the lowest obfuscation firm always has the lowest price.
The mass point reflects the value of complexity averse consumers relative to the maximum
demand the seller could obtain if he also offered the lowest price. It can be interpreted as
the probability that the headline price is charged. Prices below the headline reflect ‘sale’ pri-
ces (Spiegler, 2011). The low obfuscation firm randomizes over headline and ‘sale’ prices
but the high obfuscation firm only randomizes over ‘sale’ prices. This is consistent with the
observation that firms vary in their use of discounting. The value of the mass point also
increases with d and decreases with lM When complexity aversion is stronger, more con-
sumers are captives for the low obfuscation firm, which increases the cost of competing for
informed buyers. When fewer consumers are informed, the incentive to compete in prices is
weaker. Proposition 4 summarizes these equilibria:
Proposition 4 The pricing equilibria in period 2 of the sequential game can be summar-
ized as follows:
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i. If obfuscation choices are identical (k), each firm draws a price according to the associ-
ated price distribution function GkðpÞ, defined over ½pk; 1.
ii. When obfuscation choices vary, each firm selects prices according to asymmetric prob-
ability distribution functions. The low obfuscation firm has an atom at 1. The high ob-
fuscation firm sets prices strictly below 1.
Example 2 Following Example 1, let lL ¼ 0:75;lM ¼ 0:5; lH ¼ 0:25. Suppose d ¼ 0:5.
Figure 4 shows the probability distributions over prices when both firms choose low (solid
curve) or high (dashed curve) obfuscation. Figure 5 shows the probability distributions when
firms differ in obfuscation. The solid (dashed) curve indicates the low (high) obfuscation seller.
2.2.3 Rationality of complexity aversion At this point, a natural question is why consum-
ers exhibit complexity aversion? This is distinct from the heavily researched question of
why some consumers fail to buy at the lowest price?11 If the least obfuscated products are
always cheapest (as in the simultaneous model), this behaviour is easily rationalized.
Consumers who cannot understand prices learn that obfuscated products are more expen-
sive and avoid them. Similarly, in Gaudeul and Sugden (2012) where 1 ¼ lL ¼ lH > lM,
aversion to individuated framing is rational because firms that use common standards face
tougher competition with each other and therefore charge lower prices. However, in the se-
quential model, where the least obfuscated products are most expensive, rationalizing com-
plexity aversion is more challenging. Here we outline several explanations.
Firstly, from a theoretical perspective, the most obfuscated products are always most ex-
pensive in the simultaneous setting. However, the most obfuscated products are only more
Fig. 4. Symmetric pricing.
11 See Grubb (2015) for an excellent overview of the literature on this topic.
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expensive on average in the sequential setting. Therefore, the negative correlation may not
be visible to consumers. Secondly, for uninformed consumers to learn that obfuscated prod-
ucts are cheaper, consumers need to repeatedly buy both types. However, recent evidence
indicates that consumers often fail to learn of the sub-optimality of their choice because
they do not consider the counter-factual alternative (Wilson and Waddams Price, 2010;
Huck and Wallace, 2015).
Thirdly, consumers may derive additional benefits from avoiding complex products. For
instance, more complicated price frames may be costlier for consumers to understand in
terms of effort, inducing buyers to select the simpler alternative. Consumers may also prefer
to use a ‘fast’ decision-making heuristic of choosing the simplest alternative to avoid the
‘slow’ and intellectually taxing price-comparison process (Spenner and Freeman, 2012).12
Recent evidence also indicates that consumers perceive obfuscated products to be unfair
and consider obfuscating sellers to be untrustworthy (Homburg et al., 2014). Therefore,
consumers choose simple alternatives that they trust more. These explanations are also con-
sistent with evidence that consumers will pay a price premium for simplicity (Homburg
et al., 2014; Siegel and Gale, 2017). Finally, confused consumers may incorrectly estimate
that complex products are most expensive, which induces buyers to choose the simplest al-
ternative (Homburg et al., 2014).
We now characterize the optimal obfuscation strategy in period 1. Firms face competing
incentives. Higher obfuscation softens price competition but reduces the probability that
the firm attracts complexity averse consumers. The relative strength of these incentives
depends on the parameters governing consumer sophistication ðlL;lM; lHÞ and complexity
aversion ðdÞ. We outline the equilibria before evaluating the incidence of complexity
aversion.
Fig. 5. Asymmetric pricing.
12 We are grateful to the anonymous referees for suggesting these two explanations.
R. EDWARDS 789
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/oep/article-abstract/71/3/777/5116219 by Periodicals D
epartm
ent user on 01 O
ctober 2019
2.2.4 Symmetric obfuscation equilibria First consider pure strategy symmetric equilibria.
Let the expected payoff for firm i (j), given the obfuscation choices of each seller, be written
pifki;kjg ðpjfki; kjgÞ. For a low obfuscation equilibrium, we require: pifL;Lg  pifH;Lg,
such that:
1  lL
1  lM
 1  d
2 þ lMð1 þ dÞ2
1 þ dþ lMð1  dÞ
(7)
Proposition 5 A low obfuscation equilibrium is more likely when:
i. The degree of complexity aversion ðdÞ is high.
ii. The natural level of consumer sophistication ðlLÞ is low.
An increase in the natural level of consumer sophistication ðlLÞ makes low obfuscation less
likely, for two reasons. Firstly, a higher level of market complexity is required to achieve
the same level of consumer confusion. Secondly, for a fixed lM, the marginal effect of one
firm deviating to high obfuscation ðlL  lMÞ increases, which strengthens firms’ incentives
to choose high obfuscation.
Remark 3 In the sequential game, a low obfuscation equilibrium may fail to exist for all
levels of complexity aversion ðdÞ.
Consider now a high obfuscation equilibrium. This requires pifH;Hg  pifL;Hg and
translates into:
lM  lH
1  lM
 d (8)
Proposition 6 A high obfuscation equilibrium is more likely when:
i. The degree of complexity aversion ðdÞ is low.
ii. The intermediate level of consumer sophistication ðlMÞ is high.
iii. The minimum level of consumer sophistication ðlHÞ is low.
The intuition for (8) is clearer when rewritten as: ðlM  lHÞ  dð1  lMÞ. Intuitively, high
obfuscation is sustained when the marginal effect of obfuscation exceeds the value of com-
plexity averse consumers. High obfuscation is also more easily sustained when lM is higher.
We provide three reasons. First, higher obfuscation is required to achieve the same level of
consumer confusion. Second, the marginal effect of one firm deviating from high obfusca-
tion ðlM  lHÞ increases. Therefore, price competition would be more intense if any firm
deviated. Third, more informed consumers implies fewer complexity averse consumers,
which reduces the gains from deviating to low obfuscation. The intuition for a high obfus-
cation equilibrium becoming more likely when lH decreases follows from the same argu-
ments, approached from the opposite direction.
Remark 4 In the sequential game, a high obfuscation equilibrium is sustained for any de-
gree of complexity aversion ðdÞ if lM  lH > 1  lM.
2.2.5 Mixed strategy obfuscation equilibrium There exists parameter constellations where
a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. Instead, there exists an asymmetric
pure strategy equilibrium and a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. Asymmetric
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equilibrium requires: pifL;Hg  pifH;Hg and pjfL;Hg  pjfL;Lg and the pricing stage
mirrors the asymmetric equilibria in Proposition 4. We focus on the case where firms can-
not coordinate such that sellers follow symmetric mixed strategies.13 Complexity aversion
disrupts the high obfuscation equilibrium but fails to discipline firms to low obfuscation.
Let KL denote the probability that each firm selects low obfuscation where KH ¼ 1  KL.
In equilibrium the firm is indifferent over these pure strategies:
KL  pifL;Lg þ KH  pifL;Hg ¼ KL  pifH;Lg þ KH  pifH;Hg
Insert the relevant payoffs and rearrange to yield:
KL ¼ d dlM þ lH  lM
d dlM þ lH  lM  1 þ lL þ ð1lMÞð1d
2þlMð1þ2dþd2ÞÞ
1þdþlMð1dÞ
h i (9)
As in the simultaneous model, we restrict KL 2 ½0;1. For KL  0 ð 1Þ, a high (low) obfus-
cation equilibrium exists.
Proposition 7 In a mixed strategy obfuscation equilibrium, the probability placed on low
obfuscation ðKLÞ increases with the degree of complexity aversion ðdÞ.
Proposition 7 is the sequential model analogue of Proposition 3 in the simultaneous game.
Following an example, the models are compared in detail.
Example 3 Suppose lL ¼ 0:75; lM ¼ 0:5 and lH ¼ 0:25. The probability of low obfusca-
tion for varying degrees of complexity aversion ðdÞ is given by the solid curve in Fig. 6. For
d  0:5, a high obfuscation equilibrium exists. As d increases, the incentive to compete in
Fig. 6. Equilibrium obfuscation
13 Full details of the asymmetric equilibrium are provided in the Appendix. There is no systematic
ranking of the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium and symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in
terms of welfare.
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obfuscation grows until firms randomize according to KL. When all uninformed consumers
are complexity averse ðd ¼ 1Þ, firms randomize equally between high and low obfuscation.
There exists no low obfuscation equilibrium. If consumers are less sophisticated:
lL ¼ 0:45;lM ¼ 0:3; lH ¼ 0:15, a high obfuscation equilibrium is overturned by d > 0:21
and a low obfuscation equilibrium arises whenever d > 0:66, as illustrated by the dashed
curve in Fig. 6.
2.2.6 Profit, welfare and analysis To maximize comparability with the simultaneous
model, we follow the same analytical structure.14 In the benchmark case ðd ¼ 0; lL ¼ 1Þ
firms choose high obfuscation. This differs from the simultaneous game where firms ran-
domize their obfuscation because the correlation between prices and obfuscation is
reversed. In the simultaneous game, a firm with a lower price chooses low obfuscation to
increase the amount of informed buyers. However, in the sequential game, the pricing-
related incentive to choose low obfuscation disappears because a low obfuscation firm
charges the highest (average) price.
Allowing lL < 1 has no substantive effect when d¼ 0 because firms share a common in-
centive to maximize consumer confusion, regardless of the amount of consumers that are
always confused. In contrast, reducing lL < 1 in the simultaneous game increases the prob-
ability of low obfuscation.
Introducing complexity aversion ðd > 0; lL ¼ 1Þ, weakens firms’ obfuscation incen-
tives. Depending on the values for consumer sophistication and complexity aversion, a
mixed strategy equilibrium may exist or a high obfuscation equilibrium may persist.
Consistent with the simultaneous model, a low obfuscation equilibrium cannot exist when
lL ¼ 1.
In the general case: lL < 1; d > 0, the probability of low obfuscation increases (or
remains 0) with complexity aversion ðdÞ and a low obfuscation equilibrium becomes pos-
sible but only for some parameter values for consumer sophistication. This reinforces two
important insights from the simultaneous model: High obfuscation can only be eliminated
when some consumers are always confused and complexity aversion incentivizes lower ob-
fuscation. However, there are four important differences.
Firstly, the sequential model admits a wider range of obfuscation equilibria because a
high obfuscation equilibrium never exists in the simultaneous game. Secondly, a low obfus-
cation equilibrium may not exist for any degree of complexity aversion in the sequential
model but always exists in the simultaneous model when d  dc. The intuition follows that
even when all uninformed consumers are complexity averse ðd ¼ 1Þ, a firm in the sequential
game may earn higher profit by deviating to high obfuscation, to soften price competition,
and selling to informed buyers. This cannot occur in the simultaneous model because a high
obfuscation firm charges the highest price and would receive zero demand.
Thirdly, if lM  lH > dð1  lMÞ, complexity aversion has no substantive effect in the
sequential game but always increases the probability of low obfuscation in the simultaneous
game. The explanation is that the incentive to choose low obfuscation grows with complex-
ity aversion but this need not overturn the high obfuscation equilibrium in the sequential
model. In contrast, firms in the simultaneous game place positive probability on low obfus-
cation without complexity aversion. Therefore, strengthening the incentive to choose low
obfuscation increases the probability of low obfuscation.
14 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this structure.
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Fourthly, the intuition for the mixed strategy in obfuscation differs: Firms choose low
obfuscation to compete for complexity averse consumers but if both firms choose low ob-
fuscation, price competition becomes too strong and a seller prefers to deviate to high ob-
fuscation (even though this deviation benefits the low obfuscation firm most). In contrast
with the simultaneous model, there exists no additional pricing-related incentive to choose
low obfuscation.
We now evaluate the effects of complexity aversion on profit, which are more compli-
cated in the sequential framework because the relative magnitudes of the direct and exter-
nality effects come into play. Prices and obfuscation are negatively correlated. Therefore,
complexity averse consumers buy at the highest (average) price, which increases profit
(Direct effect). However, complexity aversion continues to incentivize lower obfuscation,
which increases the fraction of informed buyers and reduces profit (Externality effect). We
characterize the circumstances under which complexity aversion harms firms before discus-
sing consumer welfare.
Proposition 8 When obfuscation and prices are sequential, the effect of complexity aver-
sion on profit is:
i. Profit decreases if complexity aversion is sufficient to generate a low obfuscation
equilibrium.
ii. If a low obfuscation equilibrium is not obtained:
a. For lM þ 2lH  1, an increase in complexity aversion always reduces profit.
b. For lM þ 2lH > 1, an increase in complexity aversion may increase or decrease
profit depending on parameter values for consumer sophistication.
Without complexity aversion, all firms select high obfuscation. If complexity aversion
causes a shift from high to low obfuscation equilibrium, which is equivalent to an increase
in the fraction of informed buyers in Varian (1980), profit decreases because price competi-
tion intensifies. In the intermediate case where firms randomize their obfuscation, welfare
analysis is more complicated. A sufficient condition for profit to decrease with complexity
aversion is lM þ 2lH  1. One might wonder when this condition would be satisfied? In
practice, this condition fits well with many retail markets. For example, the Advertising
Standards Authority report that only 23% of consumers could identify the total cost of
broadband contracts on first viewing (ASA, 2016).
In markets where consumers are more informed, such that lM þ 2lH > 1, we are con-
fined to numerical analysis. The absolute and relative values of the consumer sophistication
parameters interactively determine the direct and externality effects. Numerical analysis
indicates that for a wide range of parameter values the externality effect dominates, causing
profit to decrease with d. However, this need not always be the case. This paradox is strik-
ing. Complexity averse consumers pay the highest price, yet complexity aversion can reduce
profit. Furthermore, there exists parameter values where profit is higher when obfuscation
is lower and more consumers are informed. The explanation is that the additional profit
from exploiting complexity averse buyers outweighs the strengthening of price competition
from lower obfuscation. Therefore, profits are not always higher in more obfuscated
markets.
2.2.7 Consumer welfare Our metric of consumer welfare has been solely monetary. As
discussed, a general measure is inherently sensitive to the specification of the utility
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function. It is easy to imagine that consumers may gain additional utility from engaging
with a less obfuscated marketplace. In the simultaneous game, this type of additional utility
has no impact on the results: Consumers are always better off when complexity aversion is
higher. However, in the sequential case this need not be true.
Under a low obfuscation equilibrium in the sequential model, complexity averse con-
sumers buy at the same price as their random-purchase counterparts and all consumers are
better off due to the externality effect of complexity aversion. However, when a low obfus-
cation equilibrium does not arise, complexity averse buyers pay the highest (average) price
and the total prices paid by all consumers need not decrease. Introducing additional utility
when obfuscation is lower could allow both consumers and firms to benefit from complex-
ity aversion. Firms benefit from higher prices and consumers benefit from consuming sim-
ple products. It is beyond the scope of this paper to quantify additional utility gains from
purchasing simple products but this is an interesting avenue for future work.
3. Discussion
Our main message is that complexity aversion creates new dimensions of competition by
incentivizing sellers to reduce their obfuscation. This enables more consumers to behave as
informed buyers, which strengthens price competition. However, high obfuscation can gen-
erally only be eliminated if some consumers are always confused. In the simultaneous
game, complexity aversion increases the probability of low obfuscation and reduces profit.
In the sequential game, complexity aversion continues to increase the probability of low ob-
fuscation but the welfare implications are less clear and two surprising outcomes emerge.
Firstly, whilst complexity averse consumers purchase from the most expensive seller in the
market, profit can decrease with complexity aversion because of the positive externality
exerted on the market. Secondly, there exists parameter values where firms earn higher
profit when obfuscation is lower. Therefore, consumers need not be better off in less obfus-
cated markets.
Complexity aversion also introduces a prisoner’s dilemma in the sequential game. Firms
could earn higher profits by collectively selecting high obfuscation but complexity aversion
disciplines firms to a lower level. Therefore, the persistence of obfuscation in retail markets
may be symptomatic of non-price collusion. This collusion-based argument cannot be
obtained without complexity aversion because firms would have no incentive to deviate
from high obfuscation.
For given parameters, firms (consumers) are generally better (worse) off in the sequen-
tial model because of the additional pricing-related incentive for firms to choose low obfus-
cation in the simultaneous model, which generates more informed buyers and stimulates
price competition.15 More precisely, if the marginal effect of obfuscation is non-decreasing
ðlL  lM  lM  lHÞ, profit is always lower in the simultaneous model. If the marginal ef-
fect of obfuscation is decreasing ðlL  lM > lM  lHÞ, we can show profit remains lower
in the simultaneous model for a wide range of parameter values: d 2 ½0; lMlH1lM  and
d 2 lLlM1lM ;1
h
.16 One exception occurs when a low obfuscation equilibrium exists across
15 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this comparison.
16 For d 2 lMlH1lM ;
lLlM
1lM
 
, a mixed strategy obfuscation equilibrium exists in both models and sys-
tematic welfare comparisons become analytically intractable. Full details are provided in the
Appendix.
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both models; pricing and welfare are identical. However, the degree of complexity
aversion required to induce low obfuscation is always higher in the sequential model.
There also exists parameter values where complexity aversion disciplines firms to low ob-
fuscation in the simultaneous game without affecting the high obfuscation equilibrium in
the sequential game. Therefore, obfuscation is more persistent when divorced from price
competition.
3.1 Policy implications
3.1.1 Should regulators improve consumer sophistication? Regulators have developed a
reputation for market intervention to protect and empower consumers. For instance, inter-
vention in retail banking has motivated calls for intervention in other consumer-focused
industries, such as Energy and Broadband (BBC, 2017). Consumer protection policies
can be separated into two types. Some aim to improve aggregate consumer sophistication
(e.g. independent price comparison website). Others focus on protecting the least sophisti-
cated consumers (e.g. money advice services). How do these policies interact with obfusca-
tion incentives when consumers are complexity averse? We focus on the implications for
obfuscation as consumer welfare is inherently sensitive to the specification of the utility
function.
Proposition 9 Policy implications in the simultaneous model can be summarized as
follows:
i. Policies that increase the proportion of informed consumers lead to higher obfuscation.
ii. Policies that reduce the marginal effect of obfuscation may lead to higher or lower obfus-
cation. Specifically: kL is increasing in lM but decreasing in lH and lL.
In the simultaneous game, sellers attempt to counteract policies that increase the fraction of
informed consumers by increasing their obfuscation. Most concerning, in markets
where firms do not use high obfuscation, policies to increase the natural level of consumer
sophistication ðlLÞ can induce high obfuscation. Gu and Wenzel (2014) previously estab-
lished that a firm may obfuscate more in response to policies that improve consumer
sophistication. However, their arguments are very different and rely on an exogenous
unequal sharing rule for uninformed consumers. A similar policy message emerges in the se-
quential game:
Proposition 10 Policy implications in the sequential model can be summarized as follows:
i. Policies that increase the natural fraction of informed consumers ðlLÞ can lead to higher
obfuscation: A low obfuscation equilibrium becomes less likely.
ii. Policies that increase the intermediate fraction of informed consumers ðlMÞ, or decrease
the minimum fraction of informed consumers ðlHÞ, can lead to higher obfuscation: A
high obfuscation equilibrium becomes more likely.
In both models, increasing the natural fraction of informed consumers ðlLÞ and reducing
the marginal effect of obfuscation can generate higher obfuscation.
3.1.2 Should regulators encourage consumers to select simple alternatives? Policymakers
may also ask whether consumers should be encouraged to buy simple products? When sel-
lers choose prices and obfuscation simultaneously, complexity aversion benefits all
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consumers and reduces profit. However, new distributional concerns arise when firms
choose obfuscation before prices. For a wide range of parameter values, complexity aver-
sion reduces profit but the surplus is shared asymmetrically across consumer types:
Complexity averse buyers pay the highest (average) price in the market but informed and
random purchasing consumers benefit from the increase in price dispersion. Only when
complexity aversion disciplines firms to low obfuscation are all consumer types guaranteed
to benefit.
4. Conclusion
This paper provides a thorough treatment of the consequences of complexity aversion for
firms’ pricing and obfuscation strategies, consumer welfare and regulatory policy. Most sig-
nificantly, we present a new mechanism for obfuscation to be costly for sellers and demon-
strate that obfuscation can be reduced endogenously by complexity aversion in consumer
choice, without requiring policy intervention. However, obfuscation can only be fully elimi-
nated if some consumers are always confused.
Surprisingly, complexity aversion need not be detrimental to consumer welfare even
when this implies that these consumers gravitate towards the most expensive seller.
Choosing the simplest product can also be rational. When obfuscation is instantly adjust-
able for firms, the simplest products are also cheapest. However, when obfuscation cannot
be adjusted as quickly as prices, the situation is less clear and new distributional concerns
can arise. Complexity averse consumers pay a higher average price than their random-
purchasing counterparts but their choice process incentivizes firms to reduce their obfusca-
tion. This leads to lower prices across the market.
This work also highlights a unique circumstance in which firms’ profits are not always
lower in less obfuscated markets. Therefore, regulatory intervention should not be moti-
vated solely by high obfuscation. Policies to improve consumer sophistication may also be
ineffective and induce higher obfuscation by sellers, even with symmetric firms. Most gen-
erally, we have exposed the sensitivity of models underpinned by a random purchasing rule
for uninformed buyers and demonstrated that the existing literature systematically overesti-
mates firms’ incentives to obfuscate.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available on the OUP website. This is the online appendix.
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